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Introduction
Since the very beginning of the history of the concept of Bertrand equilibrium (Bertrand, 1883) , there exists the idea that such equilibrium exhibits some equivalence or convergence with the concept of perfectly competitive or price-taking equilibrium.
However, Dastidar (1995) has shown that, in the context of oligopolies with homogeneous products and convex cost functions, Bertrand equilibria are typically multiple while price-taking equilibria are unique, and Vives (1999) has shown that, in those markets, the price-taking equilibrium allocation coincides with one of the possible Bertrand equilibrium ones 1 . These results are in sharp contrast with the ones that can be (*) CEMA University; Av. Córdoba 374, Buenos Aires, C1054AAP, Argentina; Telephone: (54-11)6314-3000; E-mail: gcoloma@cema.edu.ar. I thank Alejandro Saporiti and Sergio Pernice for some comments to a preliminary version of this paper, which made me correct several mistakes. All remaining errors are imputable to me. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily those of CEMA University. 1 In previous work (Coloma and Saporiti, 2006) we have shown that some of those results can be extended to homogeneous-product markets with non-convex cost functions, which may have multiple Bertrand equilibria even in cases where no price-taking equilibria exist.
obtained for differentiated-product markets, in which Bertrand equilibria are typically unique (see, for example, Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) .
The aim of this paper is to develop a homogeneous-product model that follows
Dastidar's idea, and to show that, if we allow for a small degree of product differentiation, it becomes a case where there is a single Bertrand equilibrium. When differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique pricetaking equilibrium of the homogeneous-product market. The way to introduce product differentiation is to allow for a representative consumer who possesses a generalized CES utility function, for which the substitution among the different varieties of the same product can be measured through a single parameter. In order to keep the model more tractable, we will concentrate on a case with only two varieties, each of which is supplied by a different firm. The corresponding Bertrand equilibria, therefore, are those of a duopoly in which suppliers are symmetrical.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we study the Bertrand equilibria of homogeneous-product markets, and find conditions for multiple Bertrand equilibria to exist. In section 3, we study the unique Bertrand equilibrium of the corresponding differentiated-product markets, and its convergence to the price-taking equilibrium outcome when differentiation tends to zero. Finally, in section 4, we analyze the main conclusions of the paper.
Homogeneous-product markets
Let us imagine a market with two firms, each of which with a continuous, differentiable, increasing and strictly convex total cost function C(Q i ), where Q i is the quantity supplied by the ith firm. Let us also assume that C(0) = 0.
The product traded in this market is homogeneous, with total demand equal to Q = D(P), where Q is total quantity, P is the price paid by consumers, and D is a continuous, differentiable and decreasing function of P, with lim P→∞ D(P) = 0.
In a situation of price competition, each of the two firms faces the following individual demand:
where P i is the ith firm's price and P j is the price chosen by its competitor 2 .
The ith firm's profits, therefore, can be defined as:
or, alternatively, as a function of its output, leaving implicit the price vector and the corresponding individual demand. This implies that: 
Note that C3, together with the sharing rule implicit in the definition of
We can therefore refer to (P c , Q i ) as a PTE, understanding that this means that
The assumptions about D and C guarantee that it is always possible to find a unique pair of positive values of P c and Q i that satisfies C1 and C3. C2, moreover, will also be satisfied by the pair (P c , Q i ) implied by C1 and C3. Conceptually, this occurs because C1 and C3 determine an allocation for which price is equal to the marginal cost of each of the firms that operate in the market, and the strict convexity of C(Q i )
guarantees that its average cost is always smaller than its marginal cost for positive values of Q i . P c , therefore, will always be larger than the corresponding average cost, and hence profits will be non-negative and C2 will be fulfilled in equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Bertrand equilibrium): A pure-strategy Bertrand equilibrium (PBE) is a
pair (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ℜ 2 + such that, for each i ≠ j:
where Q i (P i , P j ) is the output supply of the ith firm at prices (P i , P j ).
It is relatively easy to show that, if a PBE exists, then P 1 = P 2 = P b . As the market-sharing rule assumed implies that D 1 (P b 
can be re-written as:
while E1 simply requires that:
When E4 is satisfied as a strict equality, we obtain the minimum price P min that can be supported as a PBE. Similarly, when E5 is satisfied as a strict equality we get the maximum price P max that can be supported as a PBE. For the set of PBE to be nonempty, it is necessary that P max ≥ P min . In fact, if P max > P min , there exists a continuum of
Bertrand equilibria (P 1 , P 2 ), with the property that in each of them it holds that P 1 = P 2
One of the elements of this set is the PTE price (P c ), as it is shown in proposition 1. The numerical example referred to in the previous paragraphs is graphically represented on figure 1. In it we see the total demand curve that we have postulated (Dt) and the portion of that curve that corresponds to each of the two firms that operate in the market (Dt/2). We have also depicted the individual marginal cost curve (MCi), and the individual average cost curve (ACi). Given those elements, the lower limit of the interval of PBE prices (Pmin) is determined by the point where ACi crosses Dt/2, while the PTE price (Pc) is that for which MCi crosses Dt/2. Finally, the upper limit of the interval of PBE prices (Pmax) is that for which the distance between MCi and Dt/2 exactly coincides with the distance between Dt and MCi.
Differentiated-product markets
Let us now assume that each of the duopolists that operate in the market supplies a differentiated product. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that differentiation is symmetric, and each firm faces the following demand function:
In this context, D is the same demand function used in section 2, and R i is the following function of P i and P j : where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that measures product differentiation. When θ tends to one, product differentiation is maximal, and Q i = D(P i )/2 for any value of P i and P j .
When θ tends to zero, conversely, the product approaches homogeneity (and the individual demand function converges to the one that we have seen in section 2).
This demand function can be derived from the optimization problem of a representative consumer. The preferences of this representative consumer are a generalization of the so-called "constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function"
The two products under analysis are products 1 and 2, respectively, and the implicit assumption is that income and prices of the other products are held constant.
In a market like this, a PBE must fulfill the same conditions stated by definition 2, namely:
If a PBE exists for this market, it must be unique. It will imply an allocation formed by a symmetric pair of prices and quantities "P i , Q i " that simultaneously satisfies conditions E1 and E3, and it will exist as long as that pair also satisfies condition E2. When θ tends to zero, this allocation converges to the PTE of the homogeneous-product case, and it therefore exists. It also exists for any θ > 0. Bertrand equilibrium prices are increasing in θ, and the profits that the firms obtain in equilibrium are also increasing in θ. The PTE allocation, conversely, is the same for any θ ∈ [0, 1], and therefore its corresponding equilibrium price is always smaller than the Bertrand equilibrium price. All these results are more formally stated in propositions 2 and 3. Proof: Applying E1 and E3 in a context of a continuous, decreasing and differentiable demand function and continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex cost functions, implies that the ith firm maximizes its profits when it holds that:
where η is the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of D (P i , and does therefore depend on the value of θ. The PBE price is increasing in the parameter θ, and converges to infinity when θ tends to one and to P i = P c = 1.4142
when it tends to zero. The PBE quantity is decreasing in the parameter θ, and it converges to zero when θ tends to one and to Q i = 0.7071 when θ tends to zero. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of our numerical example. In it we can see that, while the PTE price (Pc) is always the same for any value of θ between 0 and 1, the PBE price (P(PBE)) is increasing in θ, and it equals the PTE price when θ converges to zero.
PBE and PTE prices with product differentiation
The reader may wonder why the range of multiple symmetric PBE of the homogeneous-product case, given by [P min , P max ], disappears when product differentiation arises. The answer has to do with the fact that, when θ = 0, individual demands are not continuous in the symmetric equilibria, and they "jump" from Q i to 2⋅Q i when P i decreases slightly. If θ > 0, conversely, individual demands are continuous when both firms charge the same price, and this continuity is precisely the characteristic that determines that the PBE allocation is unique.
Concluding remarks
This paper has tried to conciliate two opposing results of the literature associated to the concept of Bertrand equilibrium. One of them is the one that appears in Dastidar (1995) , who shows that pure-strategy Bertrand equilibria are typically multiple in a homogeneous-product case 5 . The other one is the one that appears in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) and other similar articles, which show that Bertrand equilibrium is typically unique in a differentiated-product case.
By building a duopoly model in which product differentiation is measured through a single parameter, we find that uniqueness is preserved, and that the Bertrand equilibrium of a differentiated-product market converges to the price-taking equilibrium when differentiation tends to zero. Consequently, the PTE allocation is the only PBE allocation of the homogeneous-product case that survives a "perturbation" consisting in the introduction of a small degree of product differentiation.
